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MODEL FOR RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY AND SAFETY 
OF THE CONTROL CENTRES OF VESSEL TRAFFIC 
MANAGEMENT AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS
ABSTRACT
The quality of Vessel Traffic Management and Informa-
tion Systems depends on the quality of all subsystems, in 
particular the quality of control centres. The most commonly 
used quantitative indicators of the control centres’ quality 
are: reliability, availability, safety, and system failure. There-
fore, a block diagram of reliability and the model for reliabil-
ity / availability (Markov model) have been created in this 
paper and a detailed analysis and calculation of the quan-
titative indicators of critical components (servers) of the 
control centre have been performed. The quality function-
ing of the control centres will enable gathering, processing, 
storing and dissemination of timely, safe, and reliable data 
and information to the services in charge of monitoring and 
management of maritime traffic.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Information technology is experiencing a rapid de-
velopment so that the size and complexity of computer 
systems have increased considerably, and the trend 
will surely continue in the future. This has resulted in 
using computer systems in all spheres of society, in-
cluding the maritime systems on modern ships, as well 
as in supervising, monitoring, managing and organiz-
ing the maritime traffic.
In order to improve the safety and efficiency of 
maritime traffic and to protect the sea and the marine 
environment, it is inevitable to use modern informa-
tion and communication technologies for gathering, 
processing, distributing and presenting the relevant 
data and information to the participants in maritime 
transport.
The full application of computer equipment is es-
sential in the VTS (Vessel Traffic System) systems, in 
the processes of gathering, processing, storing and 
sharing data and information among the participants 
in maritime transport. The main function of the VTS 
system is to increase maritime safety and the protec-
tion of the sea and the marine environment.
Following the positive sides of the VTS systems and 
the development of other maritime systems, scientif-
ic and expert considerations have been given to the 
integration of maritime systems into a single system 
for monitoring and management of maritime traffic 
(Vessel Traffic Management and Information System 
- VTMIS). Integration of maritime systems enhances 
the efficient, safe and reliable exchange of data and 
information at the national, regional and international 
levels, the effective management of maritime traffic 
and the preservation of the sea and the marine en-
vironment. The integration of maritime systems is in 
accordance with IMO (The International Maritime Or-
ganization) Resolutions, SOLAS (Safety of Life at Sea) 
Convention and IALA (International Association of 
Lighthouse Authorities) Recommendations [1]. Direct 
benefits of the integration of maritime systems include 
increased maritime safety and, consequently, reduced 
costs due to fewer collisions, groundings, accidents 
and incidents.
The manufacturers of information and commu-
nication systems usually present the quality of their 
products by highlighting the reliability, availability and 
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safety of the computer resources. The reliability and 
availability of computer systems can no longer be de-
termined by the reliability of the hardware alone. One 
must also take into account the reliability of the soft-
ware (there are practically no systems without built-in 
software support), but also the reliability of humans, 
depending on the nature and the purpose of the sys-
tem, especially when performing tasks where a human 
is a part of the system or is activated in the event of 
failure of hardware and software modules.
Reliability of a computer system refers to the abil-
ity of an operating system to work without delay or to 
prevent the downgrade of the characteristics over a 
given period of time. The mean time between failures 
is usually given as the reliability indicator. Availability 
of a computer system refers to the system’s ability to 
provide defined services at any point in time, and the 
mean time for repair is often given as an availability 
indicator.
The overall availability of a VTMIS system is an 
integral part of the availability of all its subsystems. 
The better the quality of computing resources, the bet-
ter its subsystem or the control centre. Based on the 
technical literature, manufacturers’ manuals and the 
recommendations of the IALA, the overall failure rate 
of computer equipment and VTMIS system as a whole 
may increase from 8.7 hours to 3 days per year, i.e. 
the availability ranges from 99.0% to 99.9% [2]. If it is 
assumed that the failure time amounts to 48 hours a 
year, the obtained availability is 99.4%. Low levels of 
reliability and availability result in endangered safety 
of the ship, dissatisfaction of the master and other 
participants in maritime transport due to undelivered 
goods or services and higher maintenance costs, etc. 
Apparently, the availability of 99.4% is not acceptable 
for VTMIS systems. Values amounting to 99.999%, 
where the system failure time is around 5 minutes per 
year, are the values to be strived for in the exploitation 
of the systems.
2.  CONTROL CENTRES
A common structure of a VTMIS system consists 
of VTMIS functions and VTMIS subsystems. VTMIS 
functions are grouped into operational and comple-
mentary roles, while VTMIS subsystems include sen-
sors, communication and computer networks, opera-
tor consoles, servers, databases, video walls, system 
software and Web services [3].
The VTMIS division is based on a broad range of 
subsystems. The subsystems are divided into levels 
(national, regional, local), according to their function 
within the overall function of the VTMIS. Each subsys-
tem consists of hardware, software and communica-
tion components and VTS personnel. Control centres 
are the heart of the entire VTMIS: they include the na-
tional control centre, sector control centres and local 
control centres.
Servers are the main computer components of all 
control centres. Their number depends on the control 
centre level, i.e. on the amount of data, information 
and services provided. For a reliable and safe opera-
tion of the servers some form of redundancy is used. 
Depending on their application and configuration, the 
most common control centre servers are:
 – VTS (Vessel Track Handler) server - generates a 
systematic trace of an object which is displayed on 
the console screen and recorded in the server for 
logging and repetition. The inputs in the VTS server 
come from one or more radars (radar trace of an 
object) in the same VTS area, AIS (Automatic Iden-
tification System) system (AIS track facility) and 
other external sources such as underwater sys-
tems and GSM/GPERS systems. VTS server gener-
ates system trace object that is displayed over a 
computer network on the console screen (actual 
picture of maritime traffic) and writes to SZP server 
(the history of the building).
 – Server database (SBP server/SQL server) - where 
a distributed relational database is implemented. 
SQL (Structured Query Language) servers are 
based on a client/server concept with highly stan-
dardized application interface standards defined 
by SQL standards and standards on communi-
cation with databases. The SQL server has the 
exclusive right to manipulate the database physi-
cally. The SQL server has two basic components: a 
backend (provides functions for defining data, data 
integrity and protection, data manipulation, data 
management, etc.) and frontend (application inter-
face that receives requests for manipulating data, 
and sends a response to the given requirements).
 – The logging and repetition server (SZP server) – 
used for logging the data on objects which are used 
for analysis, evaluation and learning, i.e. training of 
the operators. Logging facilities involve recording 
vessels’ positions, courses and speeds at regular 
intervals. In addition, every event that changes the 
data is logged into the data table of the object. For 
the purpose of VTS personnel training, the rollback 
is displayed on the corresponding operator con-
soles when planning a performance to be carried 
out in similar situations.
 – Warning Server (SU server) – used to record the 
operator’s and technical alerts generated by the 
diagnostic programs that are built into all process 
modules of the control centres, radars, AIS National 
server and VPN (Virtual Private Network) network.
 – Firewall (network barriers) - involves the use of a 
proxy server to allow communication with the Inter-
net. Administration of the firewall enables certain 
inputs (ports), or partially or totally disables some 
of them. A part of the protection is performed by 
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the configuration of the router, whereas another 
part is ensured by assigning appropriate rights to 
certain contents of the servers. The proxy server is 
required in all control centres.
 – Web (World Wide Web) server - is a computer pro-
gram or a computer that receives HTTP (HyperText 
Transfer Protocol) requests from various clients, 
such as user agents or Web browsers, and re-
sponds to them by sending HTTP replies along with 
the data that are commonly HTML documents and 
associated objects (images, etc.). Web technology 
as the basis for browsing documents and commu-
nication is not dependent on the platform on which 
it is used, and because of its flexibility, it ensures 
the interconnection of different systems.
 – Streaming server - is the name of the infrastructure 
that broadcasts streaming audio and video materi-
als (also known as web radio and web TV). It implies 
simultaneous reception and playback of audio and 
video data over the computer network. It provides 
live data (signals from the camera or radio) or the 
data containing recorded maritime events which 
are delivered to the user upon request. This means 
that the server features a software application for 
recording voyage data (Voyage Data Recorder), 
which continuously records the selected data and 
output data concerning the ship or any process at 
sea as designated by the head of the centre.
The servers that are essential for providing servic-
es to maritime subjects include VTS server, SBP serv-
er, SZP server and SU server; they can be considered 
as critical components of the control centres.
3.  BASE MODEL FOR THE CONTROL CENTRE
3.1.  Methods for determining the reliability and 
availability
Well-known methods for determining the reliability 
include reliability block diagrams, fault tree method, 
method of analyzing the types of failures and effects, 
the Markov method, etc. Here are the methods used 
in this paper:
 – Reliability block diagram (RDB) is a graphical tool 
for creating and calculating the reliability of com-
plex systems. Using RDB we can create complex 
systems (serial and parallel structures) and, using 
certain methods, we are able to determine the reli-
ability, failure rate, availability, and mean time be-
tween failures of such systems.
 – Markov method is an analytical method for deter-
mining the reliability of systems. Markov method 
consists of designing a state graph, determining 
the coefficients of transitional probabilities be-
tween the states and setting up and solving the 
systems of differential equations. This paper uses 
Markov processes which are functions of two ran-
dom variables: the state of the system and the pe-
riod of observation.
There are several recommendations that will be 
used during the development of a model for the con-
trol centre:
 – subsystem boundaries with the environment must 
be selected so that its model includes only the vari-
ables that are relevant to the analysis,
 – model should neither be too complex nor detailed. 
It should contain only relevant subsystem vari-
ables,
 – on the other hand, the model must not excessively 
simplify the reality,
 – when developing the model, it is recommended to 
use some of the verified methods for developing 
the algorithms and software packages, and
 – a complete, logical and quantitative verification of 
the model is required.
The modules of moderate reliability are used for 
the calculation and analysis of quality indicators: mi-
croprocessor, working memory, disc drive of 500 GB 
capacity, SCSI controller, RAID controller, I/O controller, 
80 GB streamer and power supply. The calculation and 
analysis will use the following failure rates: VTS server 
(235.23 10-6h-1), SBP server (235.38 10-6h-1), LAN 
network (1.25 10-6h-1), SZP server (239.38 10-6h-1), 
SU server (242.75 10-6h-1) and the coverage factor 
C=0.98 [4, 5, 6, 7]. The Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) is 
the average period of time spent on the actual repair 
of a software or hardware module.
3.2 RDB of the control centre
The control centres at the same levels are com-
pletely identical regarding their hardware, software 
and personnel characteristics, so that this paper will 
deal with the quality indicators of only one centre. The 
configuration of the VPN network allows any control 
centre at the same level to take over the monitoring 
of maritime traffic in any VTS sector, i.e. each control 
centre at the same level is redundant to one another, 
thus increasing the overall availability of VTMIS.
The RDB of the control centre includes the critical 
components (marked by *) and the components that 
are required to provide the defined functions of the 
control centre, as shown in Figure 1.
RDB shows the active and backup VTS servers, four 
identical operator consoles (OK_1, OK_2, OK_3 and 
OK_4), active and backup SBP server, SZP server, SU 
server, LAN network, communication subsystem (KS), 
three radars (R3, R2 and R1 ) and AIS national server.
In the control centres, the VTS servers, SBP servers 
and LAN networks have redundant systems with hot 
reserve, i.e. the backup server operates as a “mirror” 
of the primary server. Both servers handle the same 
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data, so that there is no loss of data or information 
in case of failure of the primary and switching to the 
secondary server. In addition, each module has a 
built-in ability to detect errors (diagnostic programs); 
therefore, adding just one module can be sufficient to 
achieve the desired reliability and availability.
From the configuration and functional aspects, the 
operator consoles are exactly the same. Normal moni-
toring of the safety of maritime traffic requires two con-
soles, i.e. one operator and one supervisory console. 
Hence, when analytically considering the availability, 
reliability and safety of the control centres, a 100% re-
liable console is assumed.
On the basis of professional and practical experi-
ence, one of the main problems of a computer system 
is the power supply and power failures which make 
26% of the overall failures. Modern power supply sys-
tem uses uninterrupted power supply (UPS) which 
supplies the system until diesel generator starts. 
Therefore, when analytically considering the quality in-
dicators of the control centres, a 100% reliable supply 
is assumed.
3.3 Markov model for reliability and availability
Markov model for the reliability of critical compo-
nents containing six states is shown in Figure 2 (with-
out intermittent arcs). State 1 shows a case where all 
the servers and LAN networks function properly. This 
state is a perfect state in which the system starts 
working and is called the “fully operational state”. In 
State 2 a standby VTS server is activated, a failure is 
detected on the primary VTS server and the repairs 
are under way. In state 3 the standby SBP server is ac-
tivated, a failure is detected on the primary SBP server 
and the repair is under way. State 4 shows a situation 
where the backup LAN is activated, a failure on the pri-
mary LAN has been detected and the network is being 
repaired. The state of safe failure (SO) implies a safe 
failure of a server, i.e. a problem has been detected 
and a transition to that state is performed in accor-
dance with the procedure for shutting down the server 
as recommended by the equipment manufacturer. The 
state of unsafe failure (NO) is a system failure without 
implementing standard procedures for shutting down 
the server, i.e. the problem that initiated the unsafe 
failure has not been detected. Such events may result 
in serious problems associated with the open files 
(loss of data); they may stop the performance of sys-
temic functions or cause unexpected hardware and/or 
software problems.
Let us analyze the transitions that may occur be-
tween servers and LAN networks under certain condi-
tions:
1. Failure rates (m) and repair rates (n) of a mod-
ule are constant and not dependent on time. The 
failure rate of VTS and SBP servers represents an 
overall rate of hardware failure ( hm ) and the soft-
ware error rate ( sm ), i.e. h sm m m= + .
2. All failures are mutually independent, i.e. any fail-
ure is independent of other failures.
3. The probability of occurrence of two or more fail-
ures in the time interval tD  is negligible.
4. The system starts in a completely proper operating 
condition where all system modules operate prop-
erly.
Transitions from state to state are shown in Figure 
2; the transition from State 1 to State 2 will occur when 
the self-checking devices of the primary VTS server 









































































Figure 2 - Markov model for the reliability and availability
of critical components of the control centre
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functions to the VTS backup server. The transition 
from State 1 to State SO will take place when the self-
checking devices detect a failure of any server or LAN 
network; the diagnostic program generates a technical 
failure alert and the operator or technical personnel 
undertake defined procedures for safe shutdown of 
the server.
The system is safe but not operational. The tran-
sition from State 1 to State NO occurs when a mal-
function is not detected, and it is not known which of 
the servers or LAN is defective, i.e. the server simply 
“freezes”. The transition from State S2 to State SO will 
take place if the repair of the primary VTS server is not 
completed, and the self-checking devices of the back-
up VTS server detect a failure so that the diagnostic 
program generates an alert and the operator or techni-
cal personnel undertake defined procedures for a safe 
shutdown of the system. The transition from State 2 to 
NO will occur if the self-checking diagnostic programs 
do not detect a failure in the backup VTS server and 
the server “freezes”.
The analysis of the transition from State 1 to State 
3 (SBP server) and the transition from State 3 to State 
SO or to State NO is completely analogous to the analy-
sis of the VTS server, so there is no need to repeat it. 
Likewise, the analysis of the transition from State 1 to 
State 4 (LAN) and the transition from State 4 to State 
SO or to State NO is completely analogous to the analy-
sis of the VTS server and SBP server so that there is no 
need to repeat it.
Equations for the Markov reliability model can be 
written in the matrix form:
P t t T P tRSS RSS RSS$D+ =^ ^h h,
where each element of P tRSS^ h represents the prob-
ability that the redundant servers with hot reserve and 
the LAN network are in a particular state at time t. 
Each element of the P t tRSS D+^ h represents the prob-
ability that the system is in an appropriate state at 
time t tD+ , where TRSS is the state transition matrix. 



































































































































































































By replacing the corresponding values for the fail-
ure and repair rates and by solving the matrix equation 
of the Markov model, values for P tD^ h can be obtained 
through multiplying the vector of initial values P 0^ h 
by the matrix transition TRSS , and values for P t2D^ h 
through multiplying P tD^ h by the transition matrix TRSS . 
The general solution to the Markov model equation is 
given as
P n t T P 0RSS n$D =^ ^h h
The reliability of redundant servers with hot re-
serve, LAN, and built-in diagnostic program at time 
t implies the probability that the computer equip-
ment functions properly from starting the server 
and the LAN to time t. According to the Markov 
model for the reliability of the observed equipment, 
it is probable that the system is in State 4, State 3, 
State 2 and State 1; these states being the only 
states where the observed components work prop-
erly. This means that the reliability can be expressed 
as
R t P t P t P t P tRNS 1 2 3 4= + + +^ ^ ^ ^ ^h h h h h
Figure 3 shows the reliability of servers and LAN 
network of the control centre as a function of the value 
of the servers’ failure rate, the servers’ repair rate, cov-
erage factor and time. The presented reliability is the 
reliability of the system after 8,766 hours and 17,532 
hours without changing state from S0 to S1 and N0 to 

























Figure 3 – Reliability of the servers and the LAN network of the control centre
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Graphic presentation of the Markov model for the 
availability of critical components is made in a com-
pletely analogous way. This presentation is shown in 
Figure 2 (with intermittent arcs). The states of SO and 
NO are no more final; after restarting the system or 
repairing the hardware and/or software modules, the 
system returns to State S1, i.e. all the servers and LAN 
networks are fully operational.
The availability of all major computer components 
of the control centre is:
A t P t P t P t P tRNS 1 2 3 4= + + +^ ^ ^ ^ ^h h h h h
The equations for P t1^ h, P t2^ h, P t3^ h and P t4^ h 
can be written in matrix form:











































































































































































































































































The initial conditions at t 0=  are:
P t 11 =^ h , P t 02 =^ h , P t 03 =^ h , P t 04 =^ h , 
P t 0SO =^ h , P t 0NO =^ h .
Table 1 shows the availability of the system, the sys-
tem in the period of failure and the operation of critical 
components of the control centre as a function of val-
ues of failure rates, repair rates, coverage factor and 
time. The presented availability is the availability of the 
observed equipment of the control centre at several 
characteristic repair rates after 8,766 hours of opera-
tion.
The system’s safety is the probability that the criti-
cal components will either perform their functions or 
terminate their functions in a safe manner. In accor-
dance with the Markov model in Figure 2 the observed 
equipment will be safe as long as it is in one of the five 
states: State 1, State 2, State 3, State 4 or in State SO. 
Hence, the safety of the observed equipment of the 
control centre can be expressed as
S t P t P t P t P t P tRSN SO1 2 3 4= + + + +^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^h h h h h h
Sometimes the VTS server gets overloaded, e.g. 
due to activating more than two radars, microproces-
sor overheating or faulty operator procedures. In such 
situations, the active and standby servers VTS simply 
“freeze” so it is necessary to reboot the server or the 
entire VTS system. According to our own experience 
(use of C3I systems), specialized literature and other 
sources provided by the equipment manufacturers 
and the analysis of error codes of application servers, 
VTS failures are, in most cases, the result of software 
errors, while sometimes they are due to microproces-
sor failures (overheating of microprocessors). In such 
situations, the failure rate of the VTS server rises up 
to 40%. The result of the increased failure rate is the 
reduced reliability and availability of the equipment, 
which eventually leads to inefficient monitoring of the 
maritime traffic. If VTS server failures are the conse-
quence of transient or intermittent faults, it is just 
necessary to restart the VTS server, while the last-
ing failures require rebooting of the entire system. An 
analysis using the Markov model for availability in Fig-
ure 2 was made to demonstrate the impact of the VTS 
server on the availability of other computer equipment 
of the control centre. The analysis was based on the 
Table 1 – Available servers and redundant LAN network of the control centre
 10n = 4n = 2n = 1n = .0 2n = 0.125n =
Availability 0.999908 0.999769 0.999538 0.999077 0.995419 0.992711
The system in failure (h) 0.81 2.03 4.05 8.09 40.14 63.84
The system in operation (h) 8,765.19 8,763.97 8,761.95 8,757.91 8,725.86 8,702.16
Table 2 - Safety of the servers and redundant LAN network for different repair rates
10n = 4n = 2n = 1n = .0 2n = 0.125n =
Safety 0.999998177 0.999995767 0.999990949 0.999981567 0.999906 0.994495
Table 3 - Quality indications of the redundant components of the control centre as a result of the VTS server overload
10n = 4n = 2n = 1n = .0 2n = 0.125n =
Availability 0.9998880 0.9988800 0.9994390 0.9988800 0.9944440 0.9911650
Safety 0.9999982 0.9999944 0.9999891 0.9999779 0.9998871 0.9998213
The system in failure (h) 0.98 2.46 4.92 48.70 48.70 77.45
The system in operation (h) 8,765.02 8,763.54 8,761.08 8,756.18 8,717.30 8,688.55
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VTS server failure rate of 329.32 10-6 and the same 
repair rates as in the previous analysis. The quality 
indicators for the observed equipment are shown in 
Table 3.
It can be taken into consideration that it is pos-
sible that two persons may participate in repairing the 
modules, i.e. that they may try to eliminate the failure 
together. Ideally, the mean time to repairs will be re-
duced by half, i.e. µ will be doubled: ' 2n n= . In an-
other case, µ will increase by at least 1.5 of its normal 
value. The calculation of the quality indicators of the 
control centre is done for both situations: when the 
repair is carried out by one and by two persons. The 
calculation results are shown in Tables 4 and 5.
4.  ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
When studying the tables of the quality indicators 
for the observed equipment of the control centre, the 
following can be found: the availability, the safety, and 
the system in failure increase, whereas the system in 
operation decreases if the mean time to repair - MTTR 
is increased, i.e. if the repair rate is reduced. The qual-
ity indicators of the control centre were observed after 
8,766 hours of operation. The best values referring to 
the availability (0.999908), the safety (0.999998177) 
and the system in failure (0.81 h) are obtained for the 
MTTR of 10 min ( 10n = ). The MTTR of 10 min can 
be achieved only if the repair is performed by VTMIS 
technical staff with the telephone or Internet support 
provided by an authorized service in the Republic of 
Croatia; this refers to occasional and/or transient fail-
ures only. A satisfactory availability that is in accor-
dance with IALA recommendations is obtained when 
the repair rate ranges from 4n =  (MTTR = 15 min) to 
1n =  (MTTR = 1 hour). This range of MTTR value can 
be achieved only if the repair is performed by VTMIS 
technical staff with the telephone or Internet support 
provided by an authorized service; this refers to oc-
casional, transient, and permanent failures which are 
dealt with appropriate hardware and software tools. If 
the failure cannot be repaired by the VTMIS technical 
personnel, the intervention of an authorized service 
provider is required. MTTR ranges from 5 h to 8 h, de-
pending on the type of failure. In this case the equip-
ment availability drops below 99.27%, which means 
that the system is in failure 63.84 hours or more. The 
calculation is performed using the failure/error cover-
age factor of 0.98.
It is interesting to compare the indicators of the 
VTS operation quality when the server is under load. 
Table 3 shows that the VTS server strongly affects the 
availability of other computer equipment. We analyzed 
the case when the failure rate ( vm ) of the VTS serv-
er was increased by four times the normal overload. 
Comparing the data from Tables 1 and 3 we can see 
that all indicators of the loaded server are lower than 
indicators of quality when the VTS server is under nor-
mal load. Similar information would be obtained if we 
analyzed a loaded SBP server because it continuously 
communicates with the VTS server and stores the data 
of vessels in real time.
When observing Tables 4 and 5 it can be noticed 
that the time of the system in failure is by half shorter 
when the repair of a faulty hardware and/or software 
is carried out by two persons.
5.  DETERMINING CRITICAL COMPONENTS 
AND MEASURES FOR IMPROVING THE 
AVAILABILITY OF CONTROL CENTRES
When implementing the defined functions of a 
control centre it is essential to ensure that a failure 
of any system module does not lead to the unavail-
Table 4 - Quality indicators for the observed equipment when the repair is done by one person
Mean Time To Repair
The quality indic. 10n = 4n = 1n = .0 2n =
Availability 0.999857 0.999644 0.998578 0.992954
Safety 0.99999716 0.99995312 0.99997111 0.99781165
The system in failure (h) 1.25 3.12 12.48 61.77
The system in operation (h) 8,764.75 8,762.88 8,753.52 8,704.23
Table 5 - Quality indicators for the observed equipment when the repair is done by two persons
Mean Time To Repair
The quality indic. 02n = 8n = 2n = 0.4n =
Availability 0.999929 0.999822 0.999288 0.996456
Safety 0.9999981 0.9999962 0.9999288 0.9999288
The system in failure (h) 0.63 1.56 6.24 31.07
The system in operation (h) 8,765.37 8,764.54 8,759.76 8,734.93
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ability of the services provided by the control centre to 
the participants of maritime traffic. During the analy-
sis of the system quality indicators, critical modules/
devices were identified and special attention was paid 
to such components. It can be easily concluded that 
the peripheral computer equipment of the control 
centre (terminals on consoles, video wall, keyboards, 
mouse, printer, etc.) have minimal impact on the reli-
ability and availability of the system, because failure of 
a peripheral component reduces only the functionality 
of subsystems but does not cause their failure. In ad-
dition, sufficient quantity of spare peripheral units can 
be kept in reserve and the faulty ones can be quickly 
replaced to restore full functionality of a subsystem. 
On the other hand, critical components in control cen-
tres are unquestionably the units where the data are 
processed, stored and distributed, including servers 
with disk arrays, such as VTS server, SBP server and 
LAN network. Specifically, these are server mother-
boards, i.e. microprocessors and memory as the main 
modules.
The reliability and availability in the exploitation 
process of the control centres can be increased by the 
following measures:
 – Organizing exploitation and maintenance on a sci-
entific basis;
 – Ensuring skilled technical staff at each control cen-
tre;
 – Quality power supply (redundant power supply);
 – Proper preparation and a continuous improvement 
of the technical personnel training and their skill, 
so that the repair rate is two times higher than the 
failure rate of critical components;
 – Redundant ventilation and air conditioning at con-
stant temperature;
 – Recording and proper storing of data backups;
 – Continuous updating of data in CMMS (Computer-
ized Maintenance Management System);
 – Continuous monitoring of log files;
 – Upgrade of computers with modules that increase 
the operation speed and the server stability;
 – Detecting the causes of computer system failures, 
replacement of faulty modules and testing them;
 – Installing the antivirus and protection software;
 – Detailed elaboration of procedures for repairing 
major components of the subsystems;
 – Ensuring a minimum amount of critical modules of 
the system;
 – Updated technical documentation;
 – Continuous forecasting of failures of modules, de-
vices...
These measures ensure high level of reliability, 
availability and safety of critical components of the 
subsystems.
6. CONCLUSION
The important features of the VTMIS control cen-
tres result from the quality of the hardware and soft-
ware modules, and the diagnostic programs in each 
module, i.e. system. Almost all of the hardware and 
software modules are able to tolerate failures. In order 
to achieve this, various techniques are applied includ-
ing, most commonly, the use of hardware, software, 
time and information redundancy. By combining these 
techniques the target reliability and availability of the 
control centres can be achieved. The maintenance 
strategy, i.e. the quality of the maintenance manage-
ment information system, has a major influence on the 
availability of the control centres.
These results can be achieved and maintained 
only if the maintenance of computing resources is 
performed by qualified staff at the VTMIS technical de-
partment. This means that each control centre must 
be continually manned by a trained and skilled techni-
cian who can at any moment respond to any hardware 
and/or software problem related to the operation of 
computing resources. If an authorized service is en-
gaged and if real reaction procedures are met when 
responding to the alert (MTTR is usually 5 hours or 
more), then the system quality indicators drop below 
the values recommended by IALA (the availability of 
the control centre falls below 98.39%).
The safety of the server corresponds to the lev-
el of highly safe systems where values range from 
0.999998177 to 0.994495. The high values of com-
puter equipment safety result from the quality of the 
diagnostic programs (error coverage factor is 0.98). 
The diagnostic programs allow safe transition to the 
state of safe failure.
Promet – Traffic&Transportation, Vol. 25, 2013, No. 4, 395-403 403 
P. Ristov et al.: Model for Reliability, Availability and Safety of the Control Centres of Vessel Traffic Management and Information Systems
Dr. Sc. PANČO RISTOV 
E-mail: panco.ristov@pfst.hr 
Sveučilište u Splitu, Pomorski fakultet 
Zrinsko-Frankopanska 38, 21000 Split, Hrvatska 
Dr. Sc. PAVAO KOMADINA 
E-mail: komadina@pfri.hr 
Dr. Sc. VINKO TOMAS 
E-mail: tomas@pfri.hr 
Sveučilište u Rijeci, Pomorski fakultet 
Studentska 2, 51000 Rijeka, Hrvatska
SAŽETAK 
 
MODEL POUZDANOSTI, RASPOLOŽIVOSTI I 
SIGURNOSTI UPRAVLJAČKIH CENTARA SUSTAVA ZA 
NADZOR I UPRAVLJANJE POMORSKIM PROMETOM
Kvaliteta sustava za nadzor i upravljanje pomorskim 
prometom ovisi o kvaliteti svih podsustava, posebno o 
kvaliteti upravljačkih centara. Najčešće korišteni kvanti-
tativni pokazatelji kvalitete upravljačkih centara su: pouz-
danost, raspoloživost, sigurnost i sustav u otkazu. Stoga je 
u radu kreiran blok dijagram pouzdanosti i model pouzdan-
osti/raspoloživosti (Markovljev model) te je izvršena detaljna 
analiza i proračun kvantitativnih pokazatelja kritičnih kom-
ponenti (serveri) upravljačkog centra. Kvalitetno funkcioni-
ranje upravljačkih centara omogućit će prikupljanje, obradu, 
spremanje i distribuiranje pravovremenih, sigurnih i pouz-
danih podataka i informacija službi nadzora i upravljanja 
pomorskim prometom.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI
upravljački centar, model, pouzdanost, raspoloživost, sigurn-
ost, server, učestalost otkaza i učestalost popravke.
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